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PROCEDURE
CIVIL PROCEDURE
Howard W. L'Enfant, Jr.*
JURISDICTION AND VENUE

In Riverland Hardwood Co. v. Craftsman Hardwood Lumber
Co.,' the Louisiana supreme court had held that although a nonresident buyer was transacting business in the state within the meaning
of the long arm statute,' more contacts with the state were required
to satisfy the requirements of due process than would be necessary
in the case of a nonresident seller even though, under the facts in that
case, the buyer was making the purchases in Louisiana as part of his
interstate business operations. This distinction between nonresident
buyers and sellers was applied by the Third Circuit in Drilling Engineering, Inc. v. Independent IndonesianAmerican Petroleum Co. 3 as
the basis for its decision that the contacts were insufficient to support
jurisdiction over the nonresident corporation which had entered into
a contract under which the Louisiana corporation had furnished engineering services for the defendant over a six month period in Indonesia. The defendant had initiated the contact, had sent its vicepresident to Louisiana to negotiate the agreement, and in addition,
the plaintiff had made drilling studies and had given recommendations on how to correct operational problems encountered by the
defendant in Indonesia. The parties had also maintained regular contact through phone calls on the average of twice a week. The Louisiana supreme court reversed finding that under these facts there were
sufficient contacts to subject the defendant to jurisdiction without
denying him due process of law.4 The court emphasized that the
defendant had solicited the Louisiana plaintiff, had come to Louisiana to work out an agreement which became final when accepted in
Louisiana by the plaintiff and that it was a continuous transaction
for the six month period. And the supreme court distinguished
Riverland by finding that the present case did not involve the purchase of goods in this state as had been the case in Riverland.
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 259 La. 635, 251 So. 2d 45 (1971), discussed in The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1970-1971 Term-Civil Procedure, 32 LA. L. REv. 318, 321
(1972).
2. LA. R.S. 13:3201(a) (Supp. 1964).
3. 271 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
4. 283 So. 2d 687 (La. 1973).
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The significance of the case is not the result which is fair and
fully supported by the facts but rather the approach the court used
in reaching its decision. The court could have accepted the Riverland
distinction between buyer and seller as the court of appeal had done
and still reversed by finding that there were sufficient additional
contacts to assert jurisdiction over the buyer, but the court, instead,
tried to distinguish Riverland by saying that the instant case did not
involve the purchase of goods in Louisiana. However, it is not clear
that Riverland is so distinguishable because, whereas in that case the
defendant purchased goods from a Louisiana plaintiff for use out of
state, in the instant case, the defendant purchased engineering services from a Louisiana plaintiff to be performed out of state and in
both cases plaintiffs were suing to recover the amount due under the
contract for the goods and services supplied. Accordingly, this case
could be interpreted to mean that the Louisiana supreme court will
not apply the Riverland requirement for more contacts for a nonresident buyer than for a nonresident seller in any case and this possibility led Mr. Justice Barham to state, in a concurring opinion, that the
purchase was in furtherance of the defendant's business and that
"the opinion should not be construed to apply to the ordinary nonbusiness consumer who purchases in Louisiana for the purpose of
personal consumption and not for furtherance of a business venture." This distinction between the consumer purchaser and the
business purchaser seems required by the sense of fair play embodied
in the concept of due process because the business purchaser, like the
seller, accepts the possibility of suit in another state as part of the
risk of doing interstate business whereas clearly the purchaser for
personal use and consumption would not.
In Moore v. Central Louisiana Electric Co.,' the parents of a
fourteen-year-old boy who was killed when the model plane he was
flying came in contact with high voltage lines filed suit against the
manufacturer of the plane and the manufacturer of the control lines
and other defendants. Both of these defendants objected to jurisdiction based on R.S. 13:3201, and the trial court dismissed the suit for
lack of jurisdiction and the Court of Appeal for the Third Circuit
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed 7 finding that both defendants
regularly did business in Louisiana and regularly engaged in a persistent course of conduct in this state within the meaning of this
statute in that they manufactured products which they intended to
5. Id. at 690.
6. 257 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972).
7. 273 So. 2d 284 (La. 1973).
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sell in interstate markets created by national advertising and the
reputation of their products. One of the defendants had sold about
six thousand dollars worth of its products to a Louisiana distributor
for a period of four years and the other had made a few direct order
sales to Louisiana customers and had advertised nationally but neither defendant had any agents or employees in Louisiana. The court
of appeal noted that there was no evidence in the record showing
where the deceased had obtained the plane and its control lines; the
opinion by the supreme court made no mention of this fact evidently
considering it unimportant for purposes of applying R.S. 13:3201 (d)
which does not require that the injury result directly from the business activity of the defendant, but only that the cause of action arise
from the nonresident's causing injury in state from an act or omission
out of state and that, in addition, the nonresident must regularly do
business, solicit business or engage in any other persistent course of
conduct.' This case, as did Drilling Engineering, indicates that the
Louisiana supreme court is more willing to find the requirements of
due process to have been satisfied by activities which were considered
insufficient in the opinion of the lower courts and has thereby given
a longer reach to our long arm statutes without being unfair to nonresident defendants.'
In Martin v. Martin,10 the plaintiff filed a summary proceeding
to have the amount of past due alimony and child support determined and made executory in accordance with the Louisiana judg8. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over
a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to cause of action arising from the
nonresident's . . . (d) causing injury or damage in this state by an offense or quasi
offense committed through an act or omission outside of this state if he regularly does
or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this state."
9. See also Fisher v. Albany Mach. & Supp. Co., 261 La. 747, 260 So. 2d 691
(1972), (where the supreme court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeal and upheld
jurisdiction in an action brought against the nonresident manufacturer who had sold
the $12,958 piece of sawmill equipment which caused the fatal injuries, finding that
this sale was deriving substantial revenue from goods used or consumed in Louisiana
within the meaning of R.S. 13:3201(d)).
Also the Fourth Circuit in Boykin v. Lindenkramar,252 So. 2d 467 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1971) upheld jurisdiction over a Swedish corporation which manufactured large
construction cranes and sold them to an independent U.S. corporation which marketed
them throughout the United States. The court reasoned that the defendant knew that
its cranes would be marketed nationwide and must have intended this and so when
its cranes reach Louisiana in substantial quantities, no matter how they are marketed,
then it is successfully soliciting and doing business in Louisiana within the meaning
of R.S. 13:3201(d).
10. 250 So. 2d 491 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
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ment of divorce which ordered the defendant husband to make
monthly payments. Although the defendant was domiciled in Texas,
the plaintiff alleged that he was subject to the jurisdiction of a Louisiana court under 13:3201 (d)" because the defendant's failure to pay
alimony to his wife and children in Louisiana while he was domiciled
in Texas caused damage in this state by an offense or quasi offense
committed through an act or omission outside of state and that the
defendant had the necessary minimum contact with Louisiana because he was divorced here, his former wife and children live here
and, until recently, he worked in Louisiana a substantial portion of
the time. The court rejected the argument by finding that failure to
pay alimony is not an offense or quasi offense within the meaning of
the statute. The court reasoned that there is no Louisiana statute or
decision classifying the failure to pay alimony as an offense or quasi
offense and that liability for alimony arises under special statutory
provisions setting forth the circumstances under which the liability
exists and the procedure for enforcement and thus liability for alimony cannot be enforced through the Civil Code articles pertaining
to offenses and quasi offenses. The court refused to follow an Illinois
case" which ruled that the failure of a nonresident father to pay for
support of an illegitimate child constituted a tortious act within the
meaning of the Illinois long arm statute.
As an additional basis of jurisdiction the plaintiff relied on the
concept of "continuing jurisdiction"; that is, if a Louisiana court
acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter, the person, or the status, it retains jurisdiction even though the defendant leaves the state.
Applying this principle the plaintiff argued that since a Louisiana
court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant in the divorce proceedings, jurisdiction still existed to enforce the alimony judgment rendered in those proceedings. The court rejected this argument because
the plaintiff had filed a separate suit in a different court instead of
filing a contradictory motion in the original divorce proceedings and
therefore, the court concluded, the concept of continuing jurisdiction
has no application.
The Martin decision seemed to indicate that the concept of continuing jurisdiction could be used as a basis for personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant in a proceeding to recover past due
alimony and child support if the motion is filed in the court where
the original proceedings were held but this was expressly rejected by
a later First Circuit decision, Smith v. Smith.1 3 In that case the
11. See note 8 supra.
12. Poundexter v. Willis, 87 I1. App. 2d 213, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
13. 257 So. 2d 446 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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plaintiff filed an action to obtain an executory judgment for past due
alimony and child support payments in the court which had granted
the divorce and had determined the alimony and child support payments. Although the defendant had moved to New York following the
divorce, the plaintiff argued that the court retained jurisdiction to
render a money judgment against him. The court ruled that there was
no continuing jurisdiction because the action to obtain an executory
judgment for the amount of unpaid alimony and child support is not
incidental to the divorce and that the only case where the concept of
continuing jurisdiction had been recognized is where the plaintiff
debtor sought to modify his obligation to the nonresident creditor, his
former wife. 4 Therefore, the court concluded, since the action for past
due alimony is not a modification of the original decree, there is no
basis for applying the concept of continuing jurisdiction.
It is difficult to reconcile the use of continuing jurisdiction to
allow a resident debtor to reduce the amount of his alimony and child
support payments to a nonresident wife and children with the refusal
to recognize it as a valid basis for jurisdiction when the resident wife
seeks to modify the amount of the alimony and support obligation
owed by a nonresident husband or when she tries to obtain an executory judgment for past due payments. The Louisiana court should
have sufficient interest in the question of support and alimony to
justify retaining jurisdiction to decide questions of modification or
enforcement of its original decree. In addition, further consideration
should be given to the question of whether failure on the part of the
nonresident husband to make support payments in Louisiana to
Louisiana residents pursuant to a Louisiana judgment is causing injury by an offense or quasi offense within the meaning of the long arm
statute. 5 The court in Martin ruled that it was not but in so doing
the court did not consider the fact that a husband's failure to support
his family under certain circumstances can be a crime" and thus
should be considered an offense or quasi offense within the meaning
of the statute. In addition, strong policy reasons support a finding of
jurisdiction either under the long arm statute or by means of the
14. Carpenter v. Carpenter, 240 So. 2d 13 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1970); Dupre v.
Guillory, 216 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968).
15. LA. R.S. 13:3201 (Supp. 1964): "A court may exercise personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident, who acts directly or by an agent, as to a cause of action arising
from the nonresident's . . . (c) causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense
committed through an act or omission in this state."
16. LA. R.S. 14:74 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1952, No. 368 § 1; 1968, No.
233 § 1; 1968, No. 147 § 1; 1968, Ex. Sess, No. 14 § 1; 14:75 (1950), as amended by
La. Acts 1968, No. 647 § 1.
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concept of continuing jurisdiction because a husband ought not to be
able to escape his responsibilities simply by moving out of state.
In Swann v. Performance Contractors, Ltd.,' 7 plaintiff sued a
Jamaican corporation for the value of services performed in Jamaica
and when the defendant made no appearance, obtained and confirmed a judgment by default. Service of process had been made on
a representative of the defendant in Louisiana pursuant to R.S.
13:3471 (1) which provides that if a foreign corporation not required
to appoint an agent for service of process has engaged in a business
activity in Louisiana then service may be made on any agent or
employee of the corporation in this state. On appeal, the defendant
argued that service of process was improper because the plaintiff had
neither alleged nor proved that the defendant had engaged in a business activity in Louisiana and also that the plaintiff had neither
alleged nor proved personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The
court of appeal correctly ruled that objections to service of process or
to jurisdiction over the defendant were not before the court for review
because the defendant had not raised these issues through the filing
of a declinatory exception before judgment by default.'I On the question of whether the plaintiff must plead and prove the validity of
service of process and that the court has jurisdiction over the defendant even if no timely objection had been made by the defendant, the
court interpreted R.S. 13:3471 (1) as not requiring a plaintiff to allege
and prove that the corporation engaged in a business activity in
Louisiana as a prerequisite to valid service of process because the
requirement of a business activity is jurisdictional in nature and if
this issue is not raised by the defendant the plaintiff is not required
to plead or prove it. In the court's view, R.S. 13:3471 (1) is satisfied
when an agent or employee of the corporation is served as shown by
the sheriff's return, and personal jurisdiction is presumed. This result
is in harmony with the design and intent of the Code of Civil Procedure which assigns the responsibility for raising objections to service
of process and personal jurisdiction to the defendant by requiring
that these objections must be presented through a declinatory exception filed before answer or judgment by default,'" and if these objections are not raised through the exception they cannot be raised on
appeal,20 the proper remedy for the defendant being to bring an action
17. 271 So. 2d 294 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973), writ refused, 273 So. 2d 847 (La. 1973):
"The result is correct."
18. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 925, 928.
19. Id.
20. See Michigan Wis. Pipe Line Co. v. Sugarland Dev. Corp., 221 So. 2d 593 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1969), writ denied, 254 La. 469, 223 So. 2d 872 (1969) (no error of law).
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to annul the judgment." The defendant cannot avoid the responsibility for raising these objections by insisting that the plaintiff must
prove jurisdiction and valid service of process even if no objection is
made.
In Thomas Organ Co. v. Universal Music Co.,2 a California corporation filed suit in Louisiana on an open account against several
defendants one of whom was no longer a resident of Louisiana. Service on that defendant was made by registered mail, in accordance
with R.S. 13:3204, and was accepted by a member of defendant's
family at his domiciliary address in Missouri. A duplicate set of
pleadings was sent by certified mail marked, "deliver to addressee
only" and was refused by the defendant personally. The trial court
sustained the defendant's declinatory exception on the grounds of
insufficient service of process because the plaintiff, as a nonresident,
was not entitled to use the long arm statute. The court of appeal
reversed and held that the long arm statute was not restricted to
Louisiana plaintiffs. In rejecting the defendant's argument that the
statute was intended to protect Louisiana residents only, the court
found that there was no substantiation for it either in the language
of statute, which made no mention of plaintiffs, or in any of the
United States Supreme Court cases defining the requirements of due
process which made no mention of any intent to limit suits against
nonresidents with minimum contacts with the state to those brought
by resident plaintiffs. 3 The court further found that even though a
state may naturally have a greater interest in protecting its own
citizens, the place where the activity in question occurred may be the
most convenient forum to try the suit. This was particularly true
under the facts of this case because all of the sales had been made to
the defendants in Louisiana while they were Louisiana residents and
Louisiana would have much more interest in this action than Missouri where one of the defendants presently lives. The court concluded that "[tlo deny plaintiff service upon defendant partners just
because they had left the state wherein they conducted all of the
business which is the subject of this suit would be offensive to the
concept of 'fair play and substantial justice.' "24
Having concluded quite properly and fairly that the plaintiff had
the right to use R.S. 13:3201, the court next considered whether the
21. Dicta Realty Assoc. v. Conrad, 230 So. 2d 595 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1970); LA.
CODE Civ. P. art. 2001.

22. 261 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
23. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
24. 261 So. 2d 323, 326 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
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statute's requirements for service of process had been met. The defendant argued that the service was invalid because he had refused to
accept service and that the acceptance by a member of his family was
ineffective. The court, in rejecting this argument, found that the long
arm statute25 contained no provision against domiciliary service, and
had no requirement for a signed return receipt. As the court interpreted the statute, the requirements for service of process would be
satisfied when plaintiff's counsel sends a certified copy of the citation
and petition to the defendant by registered or certified mail. The
court was correct in rejecting the defendant's arguments because,
under the facts in this case, his position would indeed "make a mockery of R.S. 13:3204 ' '12 but the court's conclusion that the statute does
not require a signed receipt raises questions. If the plaintiff mails
citation and petition to the defendant by registered or certified mail
and it is returned because the addressee is no longer at that address
and his whereabouts are unknown, could the plaintiff validly proceed
against the defendant who has clearly had no notice of the suit? The
requirement of procedural due process is satisfied if service of process
has been attempted by means reasonably calculated to give actual
notice, but actual notice is not required 7 and sending notice by registered or certified mail to the defendant's last known address would
be, under the circumstances, reasonably certain to give him notice.
But the Louisiana statute requires an affidavit of the person who
mailed the process "to which shall be attached the return receipt of
the defendant ' 2 and one court has interpreted this to mean that
there is no jurisdiction without proof of service and that without the
return receipt there is no proof of service. 29 Under the facts in that
case no receipts had been filed but the same result might be reached
where the return receipt was marked "unable to deliver." A possible
approach would be for the plaintiff to move for the appointment of
an attorney to represent the nonresident defendant as one who could
not be served by mail or through actual delivery but who is subject
to the court's jurisdiction under R.S. 13:3201.0 Since the proceeding
would be a contradictory one against the defendant's court appointed
attorney, R.S. 13:3205 might not be a problem because it only prohibits the granting of a default judgment against the nonresident. Support for this approach can be found in the recent case of Carey v.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

LA. R.S. 13:3204 (Supp. 1964).
261 So. 2d at 327.
Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
LA. R.S. 13:3205 (Supp. 1964).
Guidry v. Rhodes, 238 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970).
LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 5091.
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Daunisa' where, after seven unsuccessful attempts to serve a defendant in an action arising out of an accident in Louisiana, an attorney
was appointed to represent the defendant and the court reasoned
that, even if the defendant was a nonresident (there was a question
whether the defendant was still a Louisiana domiciliary because a
week after the accident she married and moved out of state with her
husband who was in military service), it had jurisdiction over the
defendant under R.S. 13:3201 (c) and therefore the appointment of
the attorney was valid. The court did not discuss R.S.'13:3205 but
the decision does support the use of the court appointed attorney in
conjunction with the long arm statute and such a procedure should
satisfy the requirements of due process as discussed earlier.
ACTIONS-PRESCRIPTION

In Nini v. Sanford Brothers,32 the Louisiana supreme court faced
the interesting question of whether suit filed by a dead man would
interrupt prescription. On December 7, 1967, Nini had instructed his
attorney to file suit for workman's compensation benefits-he had
been injured on July 19, 1966 and had received workman's compensation benefits until January 16, 1967. Suit was prepared on December
8 and filed on December 11, 1967, the same day on which the attorney
learned that his client had been killed in an unrelated accident on
December 9, 1967. The trial court overruled the exception of prescription finding that the amended petition substituting Nini's widow as
party plaintiff related back to the time of filing the original petition
and after trial there was judgment on the merits for the plaintiff and
the court of appeal affirmed.3 3 The supreme court agreed with the
lower courts that the amended petition related back to time of filing
under Code of Civil Procedure article 115311 but preferred to base its
decision on the "more basic question: does a suit filed on behalf of a
plaintiff who has died prior to the filing of the suit interrupt prescription? ' 3 1 In answering this question in the affirmative, the court found
that the one year limitation on workman's compensation actions"
31. 274 So. 2d 447 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
32. 276 So. 2d 262 (La. 1973).
33. 258 So. 2d 647 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
34. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 1153: "When the action or defense asserted in the
amended petition or answer arises out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back
to the date of filing the original pleading.
35. 276 So. 2d at 264.
36. LA. R.S. 23:1209 bars claims unless proceedings are begun within one year
from the accident or from the time the last payment is made.
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was (1) to enable the employer to determine when his potential liability would cease; (2) to prevent suits based on stale claims where
evidence might be difficult to produce; and (3) to create a conclusive
presumption of waiver of a claim on the part of the employee37 and
that these purposes were the same as those which applied to liberative prescription. According to the majority, the essence of the interruption of prescription is notice to the defendant of the claim asserted
and, accordingly, prescription would be interrupted even if the plaintiff had no right to bring the action as where a father files suit on
behalf of his son who was a major at the time suit was filed.38 The
court concluded that every requirement fora legal interruption existed, "the petition states a real and genuine (not spurious) cause of
action, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and proper venue,
informing the defendant that judicial demand is made for workmen's
'
compensation benefits arising from a particular accident."39
The dissent reasoned that an action can only be brought by a person with a
real and actual interest ° and so the suit filed after Nini's death was
nothing more than the filing of a paper and was not the kind of notice
contemplated by law for the interruption of prescription. And further,
the attorney-client relationship had terminated on the death of Nini.
The reasoning of the majority that prescription is interrupted
when the defendant is fully informed of the nature of the claim being
asserted against him even though the plaintiff may lack capacity to
assert the claim, is more persuasive because it is in full accord with
the objectives of prescription mentioned earlier. Moreover, the Civil
Code provides that acts done by an attorney under his power of attor37. See Harris v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 200 La. 445, 8 So. 2d 289 (1942);
§ 384 (1951).
38. Nettles v. Great American Ins. Co., 155 So. 2d 87 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1963);
See also National Surety Corp. v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 247 La. 905, 175 So. 2d 263
(1965) (a timely suit by the intervenor's compensation carrier against the tortfeasor
interrupted prescription on the intervenor's claim against the tortfeasor). 8 OEUVRES
DE POTHIER, TRAITE' DE LA PRESCRIPTION, Parte I, Ch. II, No. 54 (1835).
However, a case which seems out of line with the majority's reasoning that the
essence of the legal interruption is timely to the defendant is Miller v. New Orleans
Public Service, Inc., 250 So. 2d 108 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1971), where prescription was
held interrupted by the filing of the action within the one year prescriptive period for
tort actions in a competent court even though, at the plaintiff's request, the defendant
was not informed, through service of process, of the commencement of the action until
three years and ten months after the filing and almost five years after the accident.
The defendant had been informed of the suit by letter more than a year after suit had
been filed and that there would be no service of process in the hopes of an amicable
settlement.
39. 276 So. 2d at 266.
40. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 681.
MALONE, LOUISIANA WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE
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ney before he learns of the death of his principal are valid4' and so
the filing of the suit would be valid if done before the attorney learned
of the death of his client. But if the suit had been filed afterwards so
that it would clearly be an unauthorized suit, would it interrupt
prescription? The argument in favor of interruption is that the defendant would be fully informed of the nature and basis of the claim
asserted but, on the other hand, the filing of a suit by an attorney
without authority to do so is close to the mere filing of a paper discussed by the dissent. Unfortunately, the opinion did not deal with
this specific issue and so its resolution remains unclear.
EXCEPTIONS

Prescription is interrupted by filing an action in a court of competent jurisdiction and venue but if the court lacks jurisdiction over
the subject matter or is improper venue for the action then prescription is interrupted only by service of citation.42 Where suit is filed in
a court of improper venue and service of process is made after the
prescriptive period has run, can the defendant urge prescription if he
has waived his objection to venue? This question was first presented
in Mayeux v. Martin, 3 where the plaintiff argued that the defendant,
by filing the peremptory exception of prescription, had made a general appearance and had therefore waived his objection to venue, and,
since the court was thereby a court of proper venue, filing not service
interrupted prescription. The court concluded that this argument
lacked merit because, even if the defendant had waived his objection
to venue (the court expressly refrained from deciding this point), the
only effect of such a waiver would be to bar a later objection to venue
and would not have the effect of making the court one of proper venue
and could not change the fact that the action had prescribed before
any waiver had been made. In addition, the defendant could not be
found to have tacitly renounced prescription because the only pleading he filed was one seeking dismissal of the suit on the grounds that
the action had prescribed.
The same argument was made in Foster v. Breaux" where the
plaintiff unsuccessfully urged that since the defendant had waived
his objection to venue by allowing a judgment by default to be taken
against him, prescription would be interrupted by filing rather than
41. Id. art. 3032.
42. LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950), as amended by La. Acts 1960, No. 31 § 1.
43. 247 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971) (Suit had been filed within the prescriptive period but service of process had been made afterwards.).
44. 253 So. 2d 569 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
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by service of process. The court of appeal expressed its total accord
with the result and reasoning in Mayeux; however, the supreme court
granted writs and reversed,45 holding that where suit is filed in a court
of improper venue within the prescriptive period but service is not
made until after the period has run, the defendant cannot successfully urge that the action is prescribed if he has waived his right to
object to venue. The majority stated that in determining whether the
court was one of proper venue (and therefore whether filing or service
interrupted prescription) the critical time is when the plea of prescription is presented not when the action was originally filed, and
therefore if the court has become a court of proper venue because the
defendant has waived his objection to venue, then prescription is
interrupted if the action had been timely filed. The majority recognized that this construction of R.S. 9:5801 was not free from doubt
but supported its position by citing the principle that prescriptive
statutes are to be strictly construed and the construction which permits the action is favored over that which bars it." In addition, the
court reasoned that prescription may be renounced expressly or tacitly47 and so it would follow that if a party renounced the right to
plead a circumstance (improper venue) which would validate a plea
of prescription, he cannot re-urge what has been renounced to validate his plea." Since under the rule in Foster waiver of the objection
to venue could result in the loss of the plea of prescription, the defendant must proceed carefully to preserve his objection of venue and
in this regard Foster raises serious questions and presents certain
difficulties. For example, what does the defendant do if the plaintiff
timely files in a court of improper venue and service is made after the
prescription period has run? Ordinarily, the defendant would immediately file the peremptory exception of prescription but by so doing
he makes a general appearance and waives the declinatory exception
of improper venue;" does this mean he has, like the defendant in
45. 263 La. 1112, 270 So. 2d 526 (1972). The case is the subject of a student
casenote in 34 LA. L. REV. 463 (1974).
46. The court cited Union Carbon Co. v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 230 La. 709,
89 So. 2d 209 (1956); Mansur v. Abraham, 183 La. 633, 164 So. 421 (1935). Cf. State
v. Stewart Bros. Cotton, 193 La. 16, 190 So. 317 (1939).
47. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3460-61.
48. The court cited a case holding that when a party withdraws a plea of prescription, he has abandoned it and may not re-urge it. Marionneaux v. Brugier, 1 McGloin
257 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1881); cf., Succession of Harvey v. Harvey, 44 La. Ann. 80, 10
So. 410 (1892); Coon v. Brashear, 7 La. 265 (1834).
49. An objection to venue can only be raised through the declinatory exception
which must be filed before answer or judgment by default-Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 928-or before the defendant makes a general appear-
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Foster, also lost his objection of prescription? The court in Mayeux
had held that he had not and the majority noted that where a party
files a plea of prescription at a time when the venue is improper he
does not waive his right to plead that the suit is prescribed because
of improper venue, citing Mayeux. If the court had stopped there, it
would have been reasonable to conclude that Mayeux was still valid
and that a defendant would not waive his venue objection by filing
the plea of prescription first. But the court cast considerable doubt
on the continued validity of Mayeux by stating that if a defendant
files a peremptory exception of prescription subsequently to filing a
declinatory objection to venue, he waives the venue objection by
making a general appearance. There would be no waiver, the court
reasoned, if he files his plea of prescription based on improper venue
along with his declinatory attack on venue. This would not be a
general appearance within the meaning of Code of Civil Procedure
article 7 because the defendant is required by law to plead these
objections together "since otherwise he would waive his right to question the venue. ' 50 Therefore, the careful practitioner should file a
declinatory objection to improper venue first which, as the dissent
pointed out, means that the action would be dismissed or transferred
to a court of proper venue and the plea of prescription would be raised
only after the plaintiff refiles in a court of proper venue or would be
raised in the transferee forum. Such a result only delays the final
disposition of the case on the basis of prescription and makes Louisiana's exceptions even more technical than they were already. If the
defendant filed both a declinatory exception objecting to venue and
a peremptory exception objecting to prescription, the same result
would probably occur because the court would first dispose of the case
on the basis of the venue objection and either dismiss or transfer. In
the words of the dissent, "[t]he better rule would be one which
preserves to a litigant the right to choose the procedural vehicle that
will finally dispose of the matter without requiring him to exhaust
dilatory tactics."'"
EXECUTORY PROCESS AND SEQUESTRATION
In two very important cases the Louisiana supreme court sustained the validity of executory process and the writ of sequestration
against challenges that these procedures were not in accord with the
requirements of procedural due process. The challenge to the writ of
ance-Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 925.
50. 263 La. at 1123, 270 So. 2d at 530.
51. Id. at 1127, 270 So. 2d at 531.
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sequestration arose in W. T. Grant Co. v. Mitchell" when the creditor
sued to collect an installment sales contract and had the defendant's
stereo, stove, refrigerator, and washer seized under the writ of sequestration based on his belief that the defendant might encumber or
dispose of the property during the proceedings. 3 The defendant
moved to dissolve the writ of sequestration on the grounds that the
stove, refrigerator, and washer were exempt from seizure under state
law54 and also on the grounds that the seizure was a denial of due
process because he was not given notice or an opportunity to defend
his property before it was seized. The motion to dissolve the writ was
denied by the trial court and an application for review was denied by
the court of appeal but granted by the Louisiana supreme court which
affirmed the trial court's ruling.
In rejecting defendant's objections based on the statute exempting such property from seizure under "any writ, mandate or process
whatsoever," 5 the court interpreted this statute as applying to seizures in execution of judgments and not to seizures under provisional
remedies such as sequestration. In reaching this conclusion the court
relied on the fact that it is found in the Revised Statutes in the
section dealing with seizures in general which also contains provisions
dealing with the execution of judgments and not in the separate
chapter dealing with the provisional remedies. Moreover this statute
replaced Code of Practice article 644 which had been held to apply
only to seizures in the execution of judgments and not to provisional
seizures.
In arguing a denial of due process the defendant relied primarily
on the United States Supreme Court decision of Fuentes v. Shevin56
in which prejudgment replevin statutes were held unconstitutional
because the debtor was not given an opportunity to defend his property before it was seized. In that decision the court noted that if the
creditor could show immediate danger that the debtor might conceal
or destroy the goods then seizure before the debtor has had an opportunity to be heard might be justified and the Louisiana supreme court
52. 263 La. 267, 269 So. 2d 186 (1972).
53. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 3571.
54. LA. R.S. 13:3881 exempts from seizure "under any writ, mandate, or process
whatsoever" a stove, refrigerator and washer.
55. LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1960), as amended by La. Acts 1961, No. 25 § 1; 1970,

No. 242 § 1.
56. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This case and its effect on Louisiana creditors is discussed
in Anderson and L'Enfant, Fuentes v. Shevin: ProceduralDue Process and Louisiana
Creditor's Remedies, 33 LA. L. REV. 62 (1972) and Comment, 47 TUL. L. REV. 806

(1973).
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concluded that that exception applied to the instant case. But the
court also based the validity of sequestration on the defendant's consent to its use. The court reasoned that since the purchaser is conclusively presumed to know the law, he knows that the sale gives the
buyer a vendor's privilege and with it the right to use the writ of
sequestration whereby the property may be seized without prior notice if the buyer defaults in his payments and, therefore, the buyer,
through the act of purchase, consented to the use of this remedy.
The conclusion of the majority that the property is not exempt
on state law grounds seems questionable in the light of the very broad
and unambiguous language of the statute itself exempting the prop51
erty from seizure by "any writ, mandate, or process whatsoever,
particularly when the statute is viewed in the light of its policy objective of providing the debtor and his family with the minimum household furnishings necessary for health and activity. 5 Accordingly, such
statutes should receive a liberal construction." There is also an unacceptable practical result. According to the majority this property,
although not exempt from seizure under a writ of sequestration,
would be exempt from sale under the writ of fieri facias in execution
of a judgment. Thus the creditor is able to seize property which
cannot be sold to satisfy any judgment obtained against the defendant; all the creditor can do is deprive the debtor of his property
under the writ of sequestration pending a final judgment at which
point it must be returned since it is exempt from sale. To treat the
property as exempt from seizure even under the writ of sequestration
would be in accord with the language and spirit of the statute and
would produce consistent results. The court's ruling on the constitutional issue is not settled because the United States Supreme Court
granted the defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. 0
In Buckner v. Carmack,6 ' the defendant successfully challenged
the constitutionality of Louisiana's executory process, specifically
articles 2638 and 2639 of the Code of Civil Procedure, in the trial
court, but on appeal the Louisiana supreme court upheld the constitutionality of the procedure. The defendants' position was based on
the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Fuentes v. Shevin 2
which held that due process requires that a debtor must be given
57.
No. 242
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

LA. R.S. 13:3881 (Supp. 1960), as amended by La. Acts 1961, No. 25 § 1; 1970,
§ 1.
Young v. Geter, 185 La. 709, 170 So. 240 (1936).
Id.
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 93 S. Ct. 2276 (1973).
272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973).
407 U.S. 67 (1972). See note 56 supra.
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notice and an opportunity to be heard before he is deprived of a
significant property interest. The majority distinguished Louisiana's
executory procedure from the replevin procedures struck down in
Fuentes because, unlike the writ of replevin which could be issued by
the clerk of court on the ex parte allegations of the creditor, the writ
of seizure in an executory proceeding could only be issued by the
judge 3 who must be satisfied that the petition is supported by authentic evidence of the obligation secured by a mortgage or privilege
containing a confession of judgment and any other instruments necessary to complete plaintiff's right to use this procedure and notice
is given in the form of the demand for payment (unless it has been
waived) which is served on the debtor and a copy of the petition,
although not required to be, is usually served along with the demand.
Moreover, the seizure of immovable property is usually by constructive seizure and so there is no actual dispossession of the debtor until
the sale which is at least thirty days later64 and the debtor must be
served with notice of the seizure.65 In addition to these differences
from the replevin procedure, the majority stated that the Louisiana
procedure is founded on a confession of judgment which is a contractual waiver of the right to a prior adversary hearing and, since the
challenge is to the constitutionality of the articles on their face, there
is no contention of unequal bargaining power or overreaching by the
creditor and the instrument itself did not give any evidence of abuse.
The majority noted that the confession of judgment is expressly authorized by the Louisiana Constitution in Article VII, section 44 and
6
had been upheld by the Louisiana courts"
and further, that the constitutionality of a confession of judgment whereby the debtor had
authorized the entry of a personal judgment against him had been
upheld by the United States Supreme Court in a recent case.67 The
majority concluded that the debtor has ample opportunity, both before and after seizure, to assert any defenses and objections he may
have either through an injunction 6 or a suspensive appeal."
63. The majority made no reference
Procedure which authorizes the clerk of a
of executory process.
64. LA. CODE Civ. P. arts. 326, 2331,
1960); 43:203 (Supp. 1960), as amended

to article 283 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
district court to sign an order for the issuance
2722, 2724; LA. R.S. 13:3853-55, 4346 (Supp.
by La. Acts 1961, No. 26 § 1; 1972, No. 627

§ 1.
65. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 2293, 2721.

66. Marbury v. Pace, 29 La. Ann. 557 (1877); CIT Leasing Corp. v. Bar-Tender
of Louisiana, Inc., 258 So. 2d 228 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1972); Kirkeby-Natus Corp. v.
Campbell, 210 So. 2d 103 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
67. D.H. Overmeyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
68. LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 2642, 2751-54.
69. Id. art. 2642.
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The dissent recognized the differences between the replevin procedure and Louisiana's executory procedure but concluded that the
Louisiana procedure was not in accord with the requirements of procedural due process because article 2639 does not inform the debtor
of his right to a hearing before his property is seized. It simply tells
him that if he does not pay within three days his property will be
seized. Serving a copy of the petition is inadequate to meet the due
process challenge because it does not tell him of his right to a hearing
and if it is done, it is only by local practice; it is not required by law.
The remedies of injunction and supensive appeal were not, as the
dissent saw it, sufficient substitutes for a hearing before seizure. The
fact of constructive seizure was also not persuasive because in all
cases of movable property and in many cases of immovable property
there is actual seizure. The dissent concluded that, "It is not that
Louisiana cannot validly provide for executory process; it is that
Louisiana has not under the present codal scheme provided due process in executory process as required by Fuentes."7
The issue of the constitutionality of executory process is still not
definitively answered. An appeal was taken from the Buckner decision and is still pending in the United States Supreme Court. It is
noteworthy that while the Supreme Court has not acted on Buckner,
it did affirm a decision by a three judge court (with one judge dissenting), rendered after and relying on Buckner, that executory process
was in accord with the requirements of due process."

70. Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326, 333 (La. 1973).
71. Ross v. Brown Title Corp., 356 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 93 S. Ct.
2788 (1973).

